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May 2004
Lawyers and Lot Lines
Roger Bernhardt
Defending Encroachments
What do you do when your client telephones to tell you that her neighbor has just informed
her that he had a survey made and it showed that a long-standing improvement that she had
always believed was located entirely on her property in fact encroaches on his land? Can she do
anything to keep it there, despite the encroachment? There are several doctrines designed to give
some relief to owners in this predicament, but three cases reported in this issue clearly weaken
and narrow that help. Rather than proceed case by case, I will go at matters doctrine by doctrine.
Duration of Encroachments
Three Years: Permanent Encroachments Under CCP §338
One way to protect an encroachment is by showing that it is permanent and has existed for
more than three years. That should bring it under the limitations period of CCP §338(b), which
covers “[a]n action for trespass upon or injury to real property.”
Miller & Starr state this as a straightforward rule (6 Miller & Starr, California Real Estate
§14.14 (3d ed 2000)), and it is commonly cited as such by our appellate courts (see FieldEscandon v DeMann (1988) 204 CA3d 228, 251 CR 49); but that is not how two cases reported
in this issue view it. First, Harrison v Welch (2004) 116 CA4th 1084, 11 CR3d 92, reported on p
, declares that this view reflects a “flawed” reading of an old supreme court decision. According
to Harrison, seeking to remove a permanent encroachment from land is really an attempt to
recover the land itself, and therefore comes under the five-year statutes for those kind of actions,
not the three years of CCP §338. Second, according to Kapner v Meadowlark Ranch Ass’n
(2004) 116 CA4th 1182, 11 CR3d 138, reported on p
no time period applies when the
encroachment is on a way shared by others, rather than just a neighbor’s land, because the lack
of any exclusive possession in such a case means there is no trespass that would trigger the
statute.
Harrison and Kapner raise the question: If the three-year period did not apply in those cases,
what kind of lawsuits are subject to it? An owner seeking to remove an encroachment is
inevitably also seeking to recover possession of the land the encroachment occupies. Can the
three-year statute be saved by limiting its application to actions for monetary rather than
injunctive relief? While this may sound silly, the silliness is really intrinsic to the statutes
themselves, which create overlapping three- and five-year periods for the same wrong. No
distinction is going to make much sense, and now we have cases pro and con on whether three
years is enough or too little—hardly a firm ground for basing legal advice about commencing
litigation.
Five Years: Ejectment or Adverse Possession Under CCP §§318, 323, 325
Under CCP §318, an action for the recovery of possession of real property can only be brought
by someone who possessed the property within five years of filing suit; so, if the offending

structure has existed for at least five years, can your client claim that the duration alone is
enough to protect it? Harrison v Welch also rejects that argument, ruling that this five-year
statute on ejectment cannot be separated from its companion five-year statutes for adverse
possession (CCP §§323 and 325). Your client must show not only five years of possession, but
five years of possession during which the judicial and statutory standards for adverse possession
were also met. For example, the encroachment had to be open and notorious (a judicial
requirement; see, e.g., Kunza v Gaskell (1979) 91 CA3d 201, 210, 154 CR 101), as well as
protected by a substantial enclosure or cultivated and improved (a statutory requirement; see
CCP §325). The mere passage of five years, alone, gets your client nowhere.
We can’t blame the courts for being silly here. There is simply no way to reconcile one statute
that says five years of dispossessing is enough (CCP §318) with two others that say five years of
possessing is enough only if additional requirements are also met (CCP §§323 and 325). Unlike
the three-year/five-year difference, the outcome in this case is clear—five years, alone, never
wins; despite the language of CCP §318, there are simply no circumstances where that section
will apply.
Adverse Possession: Tax Payments Requirement
Theoretically, if an encroachment survives long enough, it can become invulnerable to attack
under CCP §325, as a protected adverse possession. Your client has to show that her
encroachment was open and notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, hostile, and under a claim of
title; most of which can be generally satisfied by the mere existence of the encroachment itself.
(Everybody can see it, it’s always there, and she has always believed that it belongs to her.) But
CCP §325 goes on to require her to “have paid all the taxes, State, county, or municipal, which
have been levied and assessed upon such land”—and this requirement is a killer.
In 1948, Justice Traynor held that an occupant of the wrong lot could establish adverse
possession despite having paid taxes on the lot next door, since both he and the assessor had
mistakenly assumed that the house he lived in was on the lot that he owned; the legal description
on the tax assessment rolls was not controlling for CCP §325 purposes. Sorensen v Costa (1948)
32 C2d 453, 196 P2d 900. That holding should have meant that an owner of improved property,
whose improvements stretch beyond her lot line onto the vacant parcel next door, should also be
able to satisfy the tax payment requirement of CCP §325 if the lot next door continued to be
assessed as vacant land and her own lot assessed as improved. Since Sorensen, however, the
supreme court has rejected that common sense assumption and required some “direct evidence”
that the encroaching improvements were considered in the assessment. See Gilardi v Hallam
(1981) 30 C3d 317, 327, 178 CR 624. From the language in Gilardi, it appears to me that the
Sorensen presumption applies only in parcel mix-up cases, i.e., when each owner’s house is
entirely on her neighbor’s lot, and not when there are partial incursions that arise because of
misunderstood lot lines.
The tax requirement in encroachment cases is unlikely to be satisfied. Michael Slattery at the
San Francisco City Attorney’s Office told me that our assessor’s office would not know how to
generate a bill to the encroacher in such a case and would, instead, send a supplemental bill to
the next door neighbor, as record owner, if an assessor actually saw the improvement. (He did
call to my attention Rev & T C §610, which provides that a second person may add her name to
the tax roll as an assessee, for adverse possession purposes; but he, like me, suspects that the
provision applies only when the adverse possessor is occupying an entire parcel belonging to

someone else, not just infringing on a part of it. He also pointed out Rev & T C §2188.2,
allowing separate assessments for landowners and improvers, but opined that it would not enable
the owner of an infringing building to pay taxes on just that part of her neighbor’s land.)
The combined effect of our tax rules and case holdings is to rule out adverse possession
protection in all encroachment cases. Only a possessor who sits on an entirely wrong lot and
pays the taxes properly assessed to it can be protected by the statute (and perhaps also persons
claiming adverse possession under color of title under CCP §323 (“claiming a title founded upon
a written instrument, or a judgment or decree”), rather than CCP §325 (“not founded upon a
written instrument, judgment, or decree”); §323 has no similar tax payment requirement).
This difficulty cannot be blamed on the statute; it is strictly the result of some judicial rule
making. The legislature may have been at fault initially for adding a completely unrelated tax
payment requirement to adverse possession law at the behest of the railroads 150 years ago, but
it was the judiciary that construed that requirement so as to inhibit the statute from
accomplishing its most beneficial purpose—legitimizing long-standing improvements that
unwittingly encroached.
Prescriptive Easements
Unlike adverse possession, the requirements for prescriptive easements do not include
payment of taxes (primarily because we have no statutory codification of this old common law
concept). However, the encroaching defendant in Harrison v Welch, supra, was not allowed to
claim a prescriptive easement for her woodshed and landscaping because, according to the court,
those easements would have been exclusive, and therefore possessory rather than usufructuary
(i.e., pertaining to the right to use another’s property) interests. That meant the easements had to
qualify under the adverse possession statutes—where they were doomed to fail because of the
tax payment requirement.
Excluding exclusive interests from the category of prescriptive easements is a fairly new
doctrine, originating with Raab v Casper (1975) (1975) 51 CA3d 866, 124 CR 590. No statute
mandates such a distinction. Despite noting that “the difference between prescriptive use and
adverse possession is sometimes obscure” (51 CA3d at 876), the Raab court then made a hard
and fast distinction between them and outlawed the protection of prescription for any heavy uses,
such as encroachments, which came close to amounting to possessory interests.
Thus, encroachments lose either way: They fail as prescriptive easements because their
exclusivity makes them possessory, and they fail as possessory interests because they are not
separately assessed by the taxing authorities. Owners of these interests are in trouble, and time is
not on their side.
Agreed Boundaries
In Tremper v Quinones (2004) 115 CA4th 944, 9 CR3d 672, reported at p Error! Bookmark
not defined., the owner of a 180-acre parcel encroached 660 feet, planting cacti and making
other improvements on the unimproved 170-acre parcel of his neighbor. One of his defenses
appeared to be that there was an agreed boundary between the parcels; given the courts’ hostile
treatment of encroachments under the prescriptive easement doctrine, it is not surprising that the
trial court rejected the agreed boundary contention here. There originally was an unqualified rule
that agreements regarding boundaries can be inferred “from the long-standing acceptance of a
fence as a boundary” (Ernie v Trinity Lutheran Church (1959) 51 C2d 702, 708, 336 P2d 525);

that rule, however, has become confined to cases in which the true boundary cannot be
ascertained from the records (Bryant v Blevins (1994) 9 C4th 47, 55, 36 CR2d 86). Modern
surveying technology makes that a most unlikely situation. See Bernhardt, Deeds on the Ground
or Words in the Deed: Bryant v Blevins, 18 CEB RPLR 141 (Apr. 1995).
It may be that the agreed boundary doctrine will be applied only when there is proof of an
actual agreement; and producing that evidence will become even more difficult as the years go
by and the original neighbors move away or die off, since such agreements are usually oral. (One
can hardly expect lay people to have put their boundary line agreements in writing when the
reason for resorting to an oral agreement in the first place was their inability to understand the
written boundary descriptions in their deeds. Just what were they supposed to say in this new
writing?) That means that the older the encroachment, the less likely it is to gain protection under
agreed-boundary law.
Good Faith Improvements
Finally, if all the above claims to defend the encroachment fail, can your client gain some
relief as a good faith improver? In Tremper v Quinones, supra, the offending cactus farmer was
allowed to remove his improvements, as CC §1013.5 provides. (In some cases, however, it may
be impractical to remove the improvements; CCP §741 provides for leaving the improvement in
place and giving the good faith improver an offset for the enhanced value of the land improved.
But there is often no enhancement for an encroaching woodshed, and the offset applies only
when the neighbor seeks damages rather than removal—which is the neighbor’s call, not the
encroacher’s.)
Thus, an encroacher not only lacks the option of paying for the removal of the encroachment,
she also may be unable to even retrieve it. As fixtures, improvements to a neighbor’s property
belong to the neighbor. See CC §1013. (For example, in Harrison v Welch, supra, the trial court
properly held that Harrison now owned the trees that Welch had planted on his land.) You can’t
remove what now belongs to your neighbor just because you originally put it there (unless you
are a tenant and it constitutes a trade fixture).
Civil Code of Procedure §871.5 permits a trial court to effect an “adjustment of the rights,
equities, and interests of the good faith improver [and] the owner of the land . . . as is consistent
with substantial justice. . . .” I take this to include the possibility of forcing the neighbor to sell
the disputed land to the encroacher. But the right to such relief is discretionary and therefore
quite uncertain. (And, as Tremper shows, the encroacher, even when she wins, has to pay
attorney fees, as well all removal damages if she is allowed to take the improvement back). At
best, an innocent improver confronts a large expenditure to correct her mistake.
None of the Above
None of the encroachers in the cases discussed above were intentional land thieves. Indeed,
they almost never are. They are usually owners who made improvements that they wrongly
believed were within their own property lines, or are purchasers who assumed that what they saw
was what they were buying until a neighbor’s survey proved them wrong. With effective adverse
possession and prescription laws, people can generally purchase property according to what they
see, and assume that the long-standing walls and fences represent legal boundaries. However, as
the doctrines that protect such expectations are increasingly weakened by hostile court decisions,
the need for surveys increases correspondingly.

Clients have always been well advised by their attorneys to pay for a survey before making
improvements close to the lot lines. And now, perhaps, they should also be advised to pay for a
survey even when purchasing the property in the first place, unless they are really sure that the
fences, walls, improvements, and even landscaping, are nowhere near the boundary lines that
those incomprehensible words in their deeds describe.

